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Abstract
Through the lens of state-of-the-art text-as-data techniques, this article examines the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) practice of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The
analysis unveils two critical trends. First, GCC states are global champions of investment protection.
In terms of protective features, their agreements are at par with the United States or Canada.
In contrast to the latter, however, GCC states typically do not accompany their protective
commitments with flexibility carve-outs. This has major implications for their investment policy.
While GCC investors abroad enjoy unrivaled protection, the GCC states are also more exposed to
investment claims than any other region. Second, notwithstanding similarities in their investment
policy and partial convergence in treaty design, GCC states have yet to cultivate a uniform practice
when it comes to investment treaty-making to speak with one voice in future negotiations with the
European Union or the United States.
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I. Introduction
For a long time, our understanding of the structures and diverging content of international investment
agreements (IIAs) was limited. The sheer number of the over 3000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and
free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters prevented comprehensive hand-coding efforts.
Studies focused instead on the more manageable body of model agreements1 or limited their purview to
selected treaty features of interest.2 The IIA universe’s size also created challenges for practitioners. As the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) put it in a recent report “[w]ith thousands
of treaties, many ongoing negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, today’s IIA regime
has come close to a point where it is too big and complex to handle for governments and investors
alike.”3
The emerging field of computational analysis of international law purports to change that. Computers
can process vast amounts of information and are therefore ideally placed to solve international investment
law’s big data challenges. By harnessing the tools and techniques developed in computer science and
applying them to the realm of law we can reveal the hidden structures of the IIA universe and reduce its
complexity for the benefit of researchers, states, and investors. In this contribution, we will introduce
recent advances in the computational analysis of investment law and apply the tools we have developed
to empirically investigate the BIT practices of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC):
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The focus of our analysis is a comparison on two levels. The first is global: How have GCC countries
fared in their investment practices from a global perspective? Are members of the GCC trendsetters or
followers when it comes to investment rule-making? Is there perhaps a distinct GCC handwriting that sets
its agreements apart from the BITs of other states? Our analysis reveals that GCC countries are global
champions of investment protection. Their agreements contain extensive investment protection obligations
that are only rarely accompanied by qualifications or exceptions. While this policy makes sense for capital
exporting purposes, it could come back to haunt GCC countries in their capacity as capital importers.
Second, turning from the global to the regional level: How does investment treaty practice differ among
GCC countries? Do we see areas of convergence when countries employ similarly worded provisions?
Policy convergence becomes increasingly important as investment law-making moves from the bilateral to
the regional level.4 Our analysis reveals that currently, GCC countries do not seem to speak with one
voice. While we do see converging practice, especially among BITs of Kuwait and the UAE, more
consolidation is needed to build a joint template for future BITs and inter-regional deals.
This article is structured as follows. We begin by introducing the field of computational analysis of
international investment treaties and summarizing some of the most important insights it has already
generated. We then deploy the tools of computational legal analysis to investigate the BITs of GCC
countries. After a brief review of the investment policies of the six states, we empirically situate their
practice in the global context, highlighting the GCC countries’ role as champions of investment protection.
1CHESTER BROWN & DEVASHISH KRISHAN, COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (2013).
2J. Chaisse & C. Bellak, Navigating the Expanding Universe of International Treaties on Foreign Investment: Creation
and Use of a Critical Index, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L.1, 14–17 (2015).
3U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [hereinafter UNCTAD], World Investment Report, 2011: Non-Equity Modes
of International Production and Development, xvi, UNCTAD/WIR/2011 (Mar. 12, 2012).
4See Wolfgang Alschner, Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law: Towards Consolidation or Contradiction?,
17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271 (2014).
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We then turn to comparing the GCC BITs among themselves, highlighting areas of policy convergence.
Finally, we conclude with some lessons learnt from this empirical analysis.
II. Computational analysis of investment treaties
Traditional means of legal content analysis are increasingly ill-equipped to deal with the growth of legal
information. It has become virtually impossible for a person to read and make sense of the more than
3000 investment treaties and the ever-rising number of investment awards. As a result, we need to find
novel means to digest and analyze international investment law materials.
Computational analysis of international investment law promises such a new approach. Not only do
computers not grow tired when reading through thousands of documents, but they also find patterns in
data that humans would not be able to spot. To be sure, robot lawyers are not going to replace human
researchers any time soon – nor should they. But the interaction between computers crunching numbers
and scholars interpreting results does provide new opportunities to tackle international investment law’s
big data problems.
A. Using textual similarity to uncover the hidden structures of the IIA universe
In a recent contribution, some of us have introduced a new toolkit for the analysis of international
investment treaties that is designed to empirically detect hitherto unknown or only anecdotally presumed
aspects of the IIA universe.5 The simple, yet powerful, text-as-data procedure we developed compares the
textual similarity of treaties or articles using a simple metric. We first split every document into its textual
sub-components of five-character length. Terms like “shall not be” thus become “shall”, “hall_”, “all_n”,
“ll_no”, “l_not”, “_not_”, “not_b” and “not_be”. Then we calculate the similarity between two documents
based on the textual components that overlap between them. The two phrases “shall be permitted” and
“shall not be permitted,” for instance, have a textual similarity of 52% (or a textual distance of 48%) due
to the word “not.” While such a percentage is of little value by itself, the comparison of textual similarity
across treaties and articles yields several new and surprising insights.6
First of all, our metric reveals a stark asymmetry in investment treaty-making. While rich countries
achieve highly consistent treaty networks whose design closely corresponds to the model templates they
employ, poorer states are party to patchworks of textually-diverse treaties. A computational assessment of
textual similarity thus allows us to empirically show in a systematic, objective and replicable manner that
developed countries tend to be the system’s rule-makers while developing countries are its rule-takers.7
Second, the same metric also allows us to trace consistency and innovation in national investment
treaty programs. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), have only made cosmetic changes to
their investment agreements over time. The UK’s network of 110 BITs concluded from 1975 to 2009 is thus
the most consistent of the world. Other states have continuously updated their investment treaties. Our
metric enabled us to detect major changes in treaty design, such as when the United States revamped its
treaty design in 2004. Less well-known innovations, such as the Finish shift to a pre-establishment treaty
5Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Universe of International Investment Agreements, 19 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 561, 564–65 (2016) [hereinafter Alschner & Skougarevskiy, Mapping ].
6Further explanations and results can be interactively explored on our website: http://mappinginvestmenttreaties.com
7Alschner & Skougarevskiy, Mapping, supra note 5, at 576.
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model that combines investment protection with capital liberalization, are also made visible. Our metric
thus provides a means to inductively investigate the evolution of national treaty programs.8
Third, our approach makes it possible to trace treaty design diffusion.9 We observed, inter alia, that
some countries copied and pasted almost entire treaties from third states. Israel, for instance, heavily drew
from British BITs when devising its own BIT program. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, in turn,
used the BITs they concluded with each other in January 1993 as templates for their subsequent treaty
negotiations, resulting in strikingly similar agreements. Diffusion also happens on the clause level.
We discovered that the language of a public policy exception that first appeared in Article 11 of the 1985
BIT between Singapore and China later diffused to India, Mauritius, and half a dozen African countries.10
What makes the clause special is that it was conceived and is exclusively being used by developing
countries, making it one of the rare treaty design innovations in investment law that is indigenous to
the South.
Fourth, the approach we developed allows us to assess the novelty of newly-concluded agreements.
The Transpacific Partnership (TPP), for instance, was initially heralded as a “new and high standards
agreement.”11 Our metric revealed how new it actually is and how high the standards are that it sets.
We found that 81% of the text of the TPP investment chapter is taken verbatim from the 2006 U.S.-
Colombia FTA. The remaining 19% is mostly used to clarify and further refine already existing standards.
Hence, while it is true that the TPP investment chapter sets higher standards as compared to some of the
earlier BITs with which it overlaps, it is very much a continuation of existing U.S. practice rather than
an IIA 2.0.
Textual distance metrics thus provide an efficient and effective way to investigate the hidden structures
of the international investment law universe. Yet, they form only a small part of what computational
analysis of international investment law has to offer. We therefore turn to another equally promising
technique: machine coding.
B. Machine coding of treaty content
While textual distance measures can reveal latent structures in large amounts of data, they are less well
suited to trace specific features that are couched in varying language. To give an example, the terms
“expropriation,” “nationalization,” or “taking” are linguistically different, but they all relate to the same
underlying concept. To capture such concepts in a treaty, researchers and international organizations have
resorted to hand coding in the past.12 Although useful, such hand-coding procedures are lengthy, costly to
implement, and difficult to expand or amend. Rule-based machine coding offers an efficient alternative




10Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers or Rule-Makers? A New Look at African Bilateral Investment
Treaty Practice (Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt Special Issue on Int’l Arb. involving Com. & Inv. Disps. in Africa, June 7, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract¼2791474 (last visited Jul 27, 2016).
11Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically Situating the Trans-Pacific
Partnership in the Investment Treaty Universe, 17 J. WORLD INV. TRADE 339, 340 (2016).
12See Chaisse & Bellak, supra note 2; see also the UNCTAD Mapping Project, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNCTAD%20IIA%20MAPPING%20PROJECT%202013-2014.pdf
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In another contribution, one of us developed a machine-coding scheme to investigate the impact of
investment arbitration on rule-making in IIAs through the lens of 55 treaty design features.13 The results of
the study were surprising. First of all, the study revealed that the inclusion or omission of an investor-state
arbitration clause does not change treaty design more generally. While states may have an interest in
counterbalancing stricter enforcement through private investors by adding new policy exceptions or
procedural safeguards, this does not occur in practice. Instead, investor-state arbitration clauses are mere
add-ons that are included in or omitted from a treaty without affecting other treaty elements.14
Second, the study also found that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, investment arbitration claims
only had a very limited impact on rule-making. While developing states often resort to unilateral measures
once they are hit by investment claims, halting their treaty program (like Argentina), or denouncing their
BITs (like Venezuela),15 developed states, as rule makers, could be expected to change the rules of the
game in response to being exposed to claims. That is not what we see, however. In fact, most substantive
and procedural treaty design innovations since the 1990s actually occurred prior to the rise of investment
claims in NAFTA. After being sued, the United States and Canada actually became further entrenched
in NAFTA treaty design. Other countries, such as Germany, did not react to investment claims at all.16
A machine coding of treaty features can thus debunk popular myths.
Finally, the mapping also showed that the biggest impact of investment arbitration on rule-making occurs
not through clauses or claims, but through case law. States have reacted to jurisprudential developments in
investment arbitration by endorsing or rejecting arbitral interpretations in their subsequent treaty-making.
The study thus illustrates that machine coding offers a promising new avenue for empirically tracing the
changing content of investment treaties and to investigate its causes and consequences.17
C. Towards an empirical assessment of GCC BITs
In this article, we build on these computational analysis tools and apply our textual similarity measures
and a machine-coding procedure to the BITs signed by GCC countries. In particular, we are interested in
two questions. First, how do the BITs of GCC countries compare to the global average? Are they
trendsetters or followers; do they champion investment protection or advocate for greater host state policy
space? Second, how do the BITs of GCC countries differ amongst themselves? Do we see any evidence of
a converging practice? By answering both questions, we can determine whether GCC BITs display a
distinct handwriting that sets them apart from treaties concluded in other regions. Before engaging in the
empirical analysis, however, this article will first introduce the investment policies of the GCC states to
provide the essential background for the subsequent interpretation of our empirical findings.
III. Background: The international investment policies of GCC countries
Our empirical investigation of GCC BITs begins by introducing the context in which these agreements are
concluded. The GCC member states pursue an international investment policy that is marked by both
13Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth versus Reality, 42 YALE
J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter Alschner, Myth vs. Reality ].
14Id. at 23–27.
15See also Lauge Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational
Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273, 283 (2013).
16Alschner, Myth vs. Reality, supra note 13, at 44–47.
17Id. at 3–4.
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capital importer and capital exporter interests. On the capital importing side, GCC states seek to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) to facilitate economic diversification away from hydrocarbons. On the
capital exporting side, GCC states invest abroad to diversify their income streams, particularly through their
sovereign wealth funds. GCC states employ a wide variety of instruments to pursue this dual capital
objective.
A. Capital exporting and importing objectives of GCC states
By acting as both capital importer and exporter, GCC members seek to use economic diversification to
reduce their dependence on income from hydrocarbons. Their dual roles as source and destination
countries for foreign capital form the backdrop against which we will subsequently evaluate the GCC
investment policies and investment treaties.
1. Inward FDI interests
The macroeconomic policy objective of diversifying away from oil and gas revenues has been a political
priority for all GCC Members.18 Economic diversification entails vertical, horizontal, and spatial aspects.19
Attracting foreign direct investment that brings in expertise, technology, and experience in non-
hydrocarbon sectors is an essential pillar of this transition.20 As part of Bahrain’s 2014 WTO trade policy
review, for instance, financial services, professional and industrial services, education and training,
logistics, information and communications technology, manufacturing, consultancy, real estate,
construction, chemicals and plastics, aluminum, water, and healthcare were identified as target sectors for
its FDI promotion.21 Likewise, Saudi Arabia, in its bid to diversify its economy, designated several areas
as priority sectors for foreign investment, including energy, transport and logistics, information and
communication technologies, health, life sciences, education, and tourism.22
2. Outward FDI interests
Economic diversification not only takes place at home but also through investment abroad. Indeed, the
GCC members are among the world’s largest investors abroad.23 To look at only two, as of 2014, the UAE
and Saudi Arabia each held, respectively, $66.3 billion and $44.7 billion of FDI stocks abroad.24 There are
two primary targets of overseas investment: (1) acquiring assets and real estate and (2) purchasing shares
in high quality financial and industrial firms.25
18See, e.g., The World Bank, Economic Integration in the GCC, (Oct. 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/
Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016); Martin Hvidt, Economic diversification in GCC countries: Past
record and future trends, 8 (2013), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55252/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016).
19WTO Secretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/TPR/S/333 (Feb. 29, 2016).
20Hvidt, supra note 18, at 26, 29, 32.
21WTO Secretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of the Kingdom of Bahrain, WT/TPR/S/294 (Mar. 18, 2014).
22WTO, Saudi Arabia, supra note 19.
23Oxford Business Group, Kuwait Expands Investment with Prudent Fiscal Management, https://www.
oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/strong-foundations-prudent-fiscal-management-has-helped-country-expand-its-
investment-horizons/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016).
24Id.
25See Nimrod Raphaeli & Bianca Gersten, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Vehicles for the Persian Gulf Countries,
15 MIDDLE EAST Q. 45 (2008), http://www.meforum.org/1863/sovereign-wealth-funds-investment-vehicles-for (last visited
Sep 30, 2016).
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Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are an important vehicle for such investments abroad.26 According to
UNCTAD, FDI stock held by SWFs doubled in 2014, marking their increased importance as global FDI
players.27 But given SWFs’ government links, policy makers, particularly in developed countries, have been
skeptical about SWFs’ expansion and concerned about their ownership stakes in strategic assets invoking
national security concerns.28 As a result, GCC countries find it increasingly important to ensure that their
investments enjoy market access and protection abroad.
B. Implementation of investment policy objectives
Three complementary pillars – international, regional, and domestic initiatives – work in concert to further
these policy objectives of the GCC members.
1. International instruments
The GCC member states have integrated themselves into the most significant planks of the international
investment governance architecture. First, GCC states are members of the 1958 New York Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) and the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID
Convention).29 Accession to these conventions marked a significant departure from prior practice under
which some GCC members’ domestic courts reviewed the merits of arbitral decisions.30 Today, investment
arbitration hearings can even be conducted at the ICSID Convention Gulf Cooperation Council Commercial
Arbitration Centre in Bahrain.31
Second, in contrast to many other countries of the Arab world, GCC states are all signators to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. While the WTO agreements primarily discipline international
trade, several agreements also touch on investment matters. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) prohibits TRIMs inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of
quantitative restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The General Agreement for
Trade in Services (GATS) liberalizes and protects FDI in services through “commercial presence” (mode 3),
securing most-favoured-nation treatment and, to the extent of the GCC states’ schedules, market access
and national treatment. Finally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) ensures domestic protection and enforcement of intellectual property, which are typically also
covered investments under IIAs.
Third, GCC states have also subscribed to a variety of other multilateral investment instruments
including the United Nation’s (UN) Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Tripartite
26Farouk El-Kharouf, Sulayman Al-Qudsi & Shifa Obeid, The Gulf Corporation Council Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are They
Instruments for Economic Diversification or Political Tools?, 9 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 124, 125 (2010).
27UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance 15 (2015).
28U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Protection of National Security in IIAs 18–24 (UNCTAD Series on
Int’l Inv. Polys for Dev. 2009).
29See the UNCTAD website listing of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) signed by GCC countries, http://investm
entpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
30Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, Note, International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM.
J. INT’L L. 643, 648 (2003).
31See the ICSID website listing of Services, which includes information about facilities, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
Pages/services/Other-Facilities.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
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Declaration on Multinational Enterprises, the World Bank Investment Guidelines, and the Convention
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).32
Last but not least, GCC states have actively negotiated and concluded international investment
agreements, either in the form of BITs or as FTAs with investment provisions (Table 1). Bahrain and Oman,
for instance, have signed FTAs with the United States. However, only the one with Oman contains specific
investment protection provisions and a mechanism for investor-state dispute settlement.
In spite of their prolific involvement in IIAs, GCC states have thus far largely been spared from the rise
of investment claims. As Table 2 shows, only three GCC states have become respondents in investment
disputes. Two of the cases against Oman are still pending. The remaining disputes have been settled,
discontinued, or decided in favor of the state. Hence, GCC states have so far never lost an investment
dispute.
At the same time, GCC investors from all countries but Bahrain have used the system to file claims
against foreign states. Many of these cases are still pending, have been settled, or have been
discontinued. Of those five cases already decided, the tribunals found the state liable in four (although
the investor was only awarded compensation in two). Hence, the experience of GCC states with investor-
state arbitration has been very positive, benefiting from it when it comes to GCC investors abroad while
not suffering its reverse consequences at home.







Bahrain 30 (23 in force) 14 (9 in force)
Kuwait 75 (59 in force) 13 (7 in force)
Oman 35 (25 in force) 13 (8 in force)
Qatar 52 (22 in force) 13 (7 in force)
Saudi Arabia 23 (17 in force) 13 (8 in force)
UAE 50 (34 in force) 13 (7 in force)
Table 2: Investor-state disputes involving GCC members (Source: UNCTAD, www.investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org).





Saudi Arabia 1 1
UAE 2 3
32UNCTAD, supra note 29.
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2. Regional initiatives
Regional cooperation, integration, and coordination efforts are an integral part of GCC member states’
investment policies. Aside from intra-GCC integration, GCC states are also involved in investment
integration efforts at the Middle East and North African (MENA) level.
The core regional initiative is the GCC itself. The thrust of the association is to deliver regional
cooperation, integration, and coordination in all domains, as enshrined in the GCC Charter of 1981.33 To
that end, in 2001, the member states signed the Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, with investment as a focus. Furthermore, the common market established in
2008, while not yet fully implemented, promises to confer upon all GCC citizens equal treatment for
investment activities, capital movement, stock ownership, and formation of corporations.34 GCC investors
thus receive privileged treatment. In Bahrain, for instance, 100% foreign ownership of businesses is not
allowed for certain types of business activities reserved for Bahraini nationals, but it is granted to other
GCC citizens.35 Membership in the GCC also guarantees the enforcement of arbitral awards issued in GCC
member states.36 This is a notable extension of the coverage for the recognition and enforcement of
awards available through the ICSID convention.37 Furthermore, the draft Unified Law for Arbitration, though
not yet endorsed, provides for arbitration to adjudicate disputes in relation to public entities.38 Statistics
bear out the fruits of the GCC integration. Comparing the period from 2003–2005 to the post-financial-
crisis years of 2009–2011, intra-GCC FDI projects rose from 43.0 to 47.9 billion dollars.39 In 2008, such
intra-GCC FDI constituted a quarter of overall FDI received by the region.40
The GCC states have also begun to jointly negotiate investment agreements with other regions of the
world. During the GCC Leaders’ Summit in December 2005, the GCC announced that they would negotiate
trade agreements as a group from then on.41 Subsequent examples include the GCC–US Framework
Agreement (TIFA) signed in 2012, the GCC–Singapore FTA that entered into force in 2013, and an FTA with
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that entered into force in 2015.42 Negotiations with several
other countries are also underway.43
At the MENA level, parallel intra-regional investment governance efforts are under way. In 1980, the
MENA economies pushed for a regional and enforceable investment regime through the Unified Agreement
for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States. The Agreement not only addresses national
33Nasser Al-Mawali, Intra-Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia Effect, 30 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 532, 535 (2015),
http://www.e-jei.org/upload/JEI_30_3_532_552_2013600079.pdf/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016).
34Raphael Espinoza, Ananthakrishnan Prasad, & Oral Williams, Regional Financial Integration in the GCC, IMF Working
Paper No. 10/90 (Apr. 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id ¼ 1586679 (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
35WTO Secretariat Report, supra note 21.
36MENA-OECD Investment Programme, Assessing Investment Policies of Member Countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/Preliminary%20assessment%20GCC%20invt%20polici
es.pdf/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016).
37Id.
38Id.
39UNCTAD, Regional integration and foreign direct investment in developing and transition economies (Dec. 3 2012),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciimem4d2_en.pdf/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
40Hassan Hakimian & Abdulla Abdulaal, (Menapolis Policy Paper Mar. 2015), http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/19890/2/GCC%
20ECONOMIC%20INTEGRATION%20(Khamsoon%20Site%20March%202015).pdf/ (last visited Sep 30, 2016).
41WTO Secretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of the United Arab Emirates, WT/TPR/S/338 (Apr. 27, 2016).
42UNCTAD, supra note 29; WTO Secretariat Report, United Arab Emirates, supra note 41.
43WTO Secretariat Report, United Arab Emirates, supra note 41.
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treatment, free transfers of capital, and expropriation, but also sets up an Arab Investment Court for claims
arising under the Agreement.44 To further stimulate intra-regional investment flows, the Agreement was
amended in 2013 with three notable themes.45 First, the Amendment enhanced the protection and
treatment of investment.46 Second, it strengthened the dispute settlement mechanism.47 Third, it fostered
the harmonization of investment policy and investment-related information.48
Finally, with respect to dispute resolution, all GCC members are signatories to the 1983 Riyadh
Convention on Judicial Cooperation between Certain States of the Arab League, which replicates most of
the obligations under the New York Convention while accounting for regionally specific requirements.49
3. Domestic initiatives
The efficacy of investment policy resides in the interplay between international and domestic frameworks.
Domestic measures and institutional structures are critical to creating more favorable investment
conditions and particularly for attracting FDI. In this regard, the GCC member states have deployed two
strategies to attract FDI.50 First, institutions and domestic laws have been established or revamped to
spearhead investment liberalization efforts.51 Second, discrete zones with separate sets of regulations and
infrastructures have been established.52
Domestically, the GCC member states have undergone major legislative overhauls in the past decade
to facilitate and incentivize investment. Several members have enacted or revised their national laws
directly related to investment. For instance, in 2015, Bahrain promulgated its Arbitration Law, which fully
incorporated the UNCITRAL Model Law. Similarly, Qatar amended its Foreign Investment Law, thereby
allowing 100% foreign ownership in a number of sectors, including agriculture, health, education, tourism,
and IT services, upon the authorization of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.53 Likewise, in recent
years, Kuwait has reshaped its legal landscape to create an investment-friendly environment through the
implementation of a public-private partnership law in 2014 and the enactment of a New Companies Law
in 2012.54
The GCC members have also formed or retrofitted their national institutions to support and promote
investment. For instance, Saudi Arabia has founded several new institutions to champion its goal of
attracting more FDI. In particular, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority Board (SAGIA) formulates
44Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter OECD], The Amended Arab League Investment
Agreement: Key improvements and ratification process (Technical Workshop, Arab League Headquarters, Cairo, Egypt, Apr.
7–8, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness//Agenda_Technical%20Workshop%20LAS_7-8%20April%
202014_Cairo_final.pdf (last visited Sep 30, 2016); OECD, Draft Brochure, The 2013 Amendment to the 1980 Arab League
Investment Agreement: A step towards improving the region’s attractiveness to investors, https://www.oecd.org/mena/
competitiveness/OECD%20Study_Amended%20Arab%20League%20Investment%20Agreement%20(English).pdf





49MENA-OECD Investment Programme, supra note 36.
50The World Bank, supra note 18.
51Id.
52Id.
53WTO Secretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of Qatar, WT/TPR/S/296 (Mar. 18, 2014).
54U.S. Department of State, United Arab Emirates Investment Climate Statement 2015 (June 2015).
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government policies on investment activities, proposes plans and regulations to foster its investment
climate, and evaluates and licenses investment proposals.55 Similarly, in early 2015, the UAE set up
the Abu Dhabi Investment Attraction Committee, which is tasked to promote sustainable economic
development and to create an attractive investment climate.56 The newly-formed committee has
commenced designing a foreign investment attraction strategy with a focus on the sectors identified as
engines for non-oil sector growth. In addition, Kuwait launched the Direct Investment Promotion Authority
(KDIPA), in accordance with Law No. 116 of 2013, which seeks to promote direct investment.57 KDIPA has a
broad mandate to perform developmental, promotional, regulatory, and advocacy functions in relation to
investment.58
The second strategy, the creation of discrete economic zones, has been widely adopted by GCC
member states. The UAE in particular has applied this approach to the fullest.59 For instance, the UAE has
several duty-free import zones throughout the country, where the same investment opportunities are
granted to foreign companies and Emirati citizens. These zones waive requirements on majority local
ownership, provide for low taxes and tariffs, and allow for repatriation of capital and profits.60 In the same
vein, Oman has three free zones that confer upon investors special rights and incentives. Prominent
examples include no minimum capital investment requirement, zero taxes on profits or dividends for 30
years, and 100% foreign ownership.61 Moreover, in each free zone, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
runs a one-stop shop that assists companies with expeditiously obtaining permits and approvals.62 Kuwait
is also in the process of creating its own free zone.63 In short, GCC countries follow similar patterns when
it comes to attracting foreign capital in order to facilitate economic diversification. With this background in
mind, we now turn to the empirical analysis of GCC BITs.
IV. Dataset
In order to investigate the content of GCC BITs, we used the dataset developed by Alschner/Skougarevskiy
(2016) comprising 1628 English language bilateral investment agreements signed between 1959 and
2015.64 We are currently engaged in a comprehensive effort to expand this dataset by collecting all
investment treaties currently in force and translating their texts into English.65 The latter is important since
most text-as-data analysis is language sensitive.
Pending the completion of this larger database, we used our existing data to provide a preliminary
analysis of the investment treaty networks of GCC countries. Currently, our data includes more than half of
55WTO, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, supra note 19.
56U.S. Department of State, Kuwait Investment Climate Statement 2015 (May 2015).
57Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority, About the Authority, http://kdipa.gov.kw/en/about-2 (last visited
Sep 30, 2016).
58Id.
59The World Bank, supra note 18.
60United Arab Emirates Climate, supra note 54.
61WTO Secretariat Report, Trade Policy Review of Oman, WT/TPR/S/295 (Mar. 18, 2013).
62Id.
63Kuwait Climate, supra note 56.
64Alschner & Skougarevskiy, Mapping, supra note 5.
65See Swiss Network for International Studies, Diffusion of International Law: A Textual Analysis of International
Investment Agreements (Call for projects on the question, “What are the design, evolution and effects of the international
investment agreements currently in practice?”, 2015), http://www.snis.ch/project_diffusion-international-law-textual-
analysis-international-investment-agreements.
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UAE BITs (27 out of 50); about one third of BITs from Oman (14 out of 38), Saudi Arabia (9 out of 24),
Bahrain (11 out of 33), and Kuwait (26 out of 80); and one quarter of Qatari BITs (12 out of 51). Our
dataset of GCC BITs is thus neither comprehensive nor can we be sure that it is fully representative.
Consequently, the results below should be taken as preliminary illustrations of patterns and trends in
GCC treaty practice that require future validation once more complete data becomes available.
V. Champions of protection: Situating GCC BITs in the investment treaty universe
How have GCC countries fared in relation to global trends and patterns in international investment policy-
making? As this section will show, GCC countries are global champions in investment protection. They
include more protection clauses than the global average. But at the same time, they do not account for
the policy flexibilities that other countries with similar deep levels of investment protection have
incorporated into their agreements. GCC country BITs are thus potent tools to protect GCC capital abroad,
but also create significant exposure to investment claims for GCC countries as hosts to foreign investors.
A. Depth of GCC BITs
Over the past twenty years the globe has seen a bifurcation of the BIT universe. On the one hand, some
countries have concluded short and simple agreements that focus exclusively on the protection of
investments – continuing a treaty design largely inspired by draft conventions of the 1950s and 1960s.
On the other hand, a number of countries, first and foremost the United States, but also Canada and
Japan, have begun to sign more complex and comprehensive agreements that treat investment protection
in its wider policy context.66
One way we can empirically trace this bifurcation is to use the number of articles in treaties as a proxy
for their breadth and depth. Figure 1 depicts the BIT universe, distinguishing between world BITs and GCC
BITs. We see that most of the GCC BITs cluster in the lower half of the chart and contain, on average,
fourteen articles. Although two recent agreements signed by Japan with Kuwait (twenty-eight articles) and
with Saudi Arabia (twenty-three articles) have branched out, most GCC BITs tend to be short and limited
in scope.
Since the number of articles is an imperfect proxy for the content of investment treaties, we turn to
machine-coding results to further diagnose the content of GCC BITs in relation to the world.
B. GCC as champions of investment protections
Turning to our machine-coding results, we arrive at a surprising finding. The GCC countries have
consistently included more protection clauses in their treaties than their peers. At the same time, they
have not followed the path pursued by other states that have complemented more protection with more
flexibility provisions.
Beginning with investment protection clauses, we see that GCC countries sign BITs that are more
protective than the global average (Figure 2). Virtually all BITs in both the world and GCC countries
contain expropriation, free transfer, and compensation-for-loss clauses. Where GCC practice diverges is on
less-frequently inserted protection provisions. Arbitrary measures clauses, entry of personnel articles, and
66Wolfgang Alschner, Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
on Modern Investment Treaty Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 455, 486 (2013) [hereinafter Alschner, Americanization ].
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prohibitions on performance requirements are found in only about 20% more BITs in GCC countries as
compared to global practice.
GCC countries are not alone in this trend towards more investment protection clauses. The United
States, starting with its first BITs signed in the 1980s, but also Canada and Japan, have systematically





















Figure 1: GCC BITs remain relatively short, while other recent BITs have become more complex and
comprehensive measured by the number of articles.




Fair and Equitable Treatment
National Treatment
Full Protection and Security
Arbitrary Measures
Umbrella Clause
Entry and Sojourn of Personnel
Performance Requirements
% of all BITs
World
GCC
Figure 2: GCC BITs are more protective than the global average.
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performance requirements restrictions into their agreement.67 This drive towards more protection in these
states, however, has been counter-balanced by the insertion of targeted flexibility clauses, which include
limited exceptions on prudential and public interest regulations as well as sectorial lists of reservations on
non-conforming measures. Figure 3 compares the average share of subjects in GCC countries’ treaties,
measured by the number of articles per subject matter, in BITs of GCC countries signed since 2000 to
those of Canada, Japan, and the United States.
Even though the United States, Japan, and Canada differ in the emphasis they accord to specific
subject areas, they consistently reserve some treaty space for general exception and non-investment-
protection provisions such as prohibitions of the lowering of environmental standards to attract
investment. Differently put, these states aim at balancing investment protection with other public policy
interests potentially affected by investment treaties. Moreover, especially with the United States and
Canada, frequent respondents in investment arbitration, they reserve specific attention to detailing their
treaties’ investment arbitration architecture. In contrast, GCC countries have been equally consistent in not
devoting significant treaty space to exception provisions and have equally done little to spell out the
investor-dispute settlement architecture of the treaties in greater detail.
In conclusion, GCC countries have joined some countries’ efforts to enhance investment protection.
At the same time, they have not included the policy and procedural safeguards that these states have
inserted concurrently. While this choice undoubtedly strengthens the protection GCC investors enjoy
abroad, it also enhances the GCC’s exposure to investment claims at home.
VI. Regional convergence in the investment policies of GCC countries
We now turn from the international to the regional perspective and take a closer, comparative look at the
BITs of GCC countries. In the above analysis, we already concluded that the BITs of GCC states are
relatively homogeneous in their content: they are more protective than the global average, while not



















Figure 3: GCC BITs by subject matter compared to other states.
67Alschner, Myth vs. Reality, supra note 13, at 40–44, 47–50; Alschner, Americanization, supra note 66, at 469.
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sharing the host state flexibility mechanisms that other states with similarly protective BITs have included
in their treaties. Yet, to what extent does this policy convergence of GCC states translate into a
convergence in the language of their BITs? If GCC states want to speak with one voice in future
negotiations with the United States, Europe, and other key investment players, they have to develop a
common vocabulary as a baseline for their joint bargaining position. Our analysis suggests that while
some GCC states already follow a common approach on some issues, the region has yet to develop a
proper, shared investment treaty language.
Let us begin with a textual comparison of the 100 GCC BITs in our data set. Figure 4 displays similarly
worded agreements as a heat map where shades of darker colors indicate more textual similarity while
shades of lighter colors signal less. Every agreement is compared to every other agreement with the
diagonal being a comparison of an agreement with itself. The ordering of agreements is both alphabetical,
based on the GCC signatory, and chronological. We annotate the figure to identify individual country treaty
networks.
Figure 4: Heat map of GCC country BITs depicting their textual similarity (high similarity: red, low
similarity: yellow).
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Two observations are noteworthy. First, countries in our sample differ in the consistency of their treaty
networks. Whereas Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia have relatively consistent treaty networks signified by the red
quadrangles that are formed by their agreements in the heat map, the other GCC states have much less
consistent networks. This lack of shared vocabulary at the country level makes it difficult to find a
common language.
Second, we also see that some states are closer in their treaty practice than others. Several red
patches emerge where Kuwait’s and the UAE’s practices overlap, indicating higher textual similarity.
We thus see groupings within GCC states. This is confirmed when we compare the protective features
country by country in Table 3. While all GCC states have particularly protective BITs with higher than
average occurrence of what are otherwise relatively rare features, some are more protective than others.
Specifically, Kuwait and UAE stand out as the champions of the champions when it comes to investment
protectiveness.
The finding of higher levels of policy convergence as between the UAE and Kuwait is confirmed when
we look at specific treaty features. Figure 5 displays the network of performance requirements clauses in
the BIT universe. Every node is a treaty article and a link is drawn between two articles if their
performance requirement clauses are textually similar to at least a 50% degree. In such representations,
clusters are typically made up of an individual country that, as a rule maker, signs consistently worded
agreements with varying partner countries. In Figure 5, not surprisingly, we see Canadian or United States
treaties clustering together. But we also see clusters made up of more than one country, such as two
clusters involving interconnected treaties by Kuwait and UAE.
Table 4 illustrates the convergence of language by comparing elements from two of these
interconnected clauses, Article 2 of the Kuwait–Bulgaria BIT (1997) and Article 2 of the UAE–Ukraine BIT
(2003), color-coding their differences. Notwithstanding some important “shall” vs “should” and less
important “laws and regulations” vs “legislation” differences, there is considerable common ground
between both agreements, pointing to a convergence in the underlying BIT practice.
VII. Conclusion: GCC BITs – In need of a change?
This contribution has used novel text-as-data techniques to review the BIT practice of GCC states. Several
lessons can be drawn from this exercise.










UAE 93% 52% 66% 41%
Bahrain 55% 55% 36% 9%
Kuwait 88% 73% 69% 81%
Oman 71% 43% 29% 7%
Qatar 50% 33% 75% 0%
Saudi Arabia 89% 33% 33% 0%
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Figure 5: The network of performance requirements clauses linked by textual similarity.
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First of all, GCC states are champions of investment protection. This accords well with the increasing
outward interests of GCC countries. Sovereign wealth funds have developed into important vehicles for
income diversification with significant ownership stakes abroad. Where their existing investments and
future acquisitions risk being obstructed by national security concerns, particularly in developed countries,
more protective BITs can offer an effective insurance policy. At the same time, the same provisions may
come back to haunt GCC countries due to their status as capital importers who count on FDI to diversify
their economies at home. Thus far the balancing act has worked well: few investor-state arbitration claims
have been filed against GCC countries and none of them succeeded, whereas GCC investors have been
more successful in vindicating their rights abroad. Yet this situation may change in the future. GCC states
may thus want to consider following the path of the United States or Canada in pairing far-reaching
protective obligations with targeted host-state flexibility clauses.
Second, in spite of shared economic objectives and an overall quite homogenous international
investment policy, GCC states have thus far not developed a common language in their investment
protection agreements. This makes convergence at the regional level and the formulation of a joint
template in negotiations with other regions more difficult. A model for such convergence is provided by
the UAE and Kuwait, which uniquely show signs of a deeper policy convergence and share common
language in investment provisions. Further regional consolidation efforts should thus build on that existing
nucleus and strive to streamline national practices by developing a common language for investment
protection that will help the GCC to speak with one voice in future negotiations.
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